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WhatsApp compromise results in Astaroth deployment – Sophos Information


Sophos analysts are investigating a persistent, multi-stage malware distribution marketing campaign focusing on WhatsApp customers in Brazil. First noticed on September 24, 2025, the marketing campaign (tracked as STAC3150) delivers archive attachments containing a downloader script that retrieves a number of second-stage payloads. In early October, Counter Risk Unit™ (CTU) researchers detailed exercise related to a separate Brazil-based marketing campaign during which the risk actors leveraged WhatsApp to deploy the Maverick banking trojan for credential theft.

In STAC3150, the second-stage payloads embody a script that collects WhatsApp contact data and session knowledge, and an installer that deploys the Astaroth (also referred to as Guildma) banking trojan (see Determine 1).Diagram showing the STAC3150 attack chain that begins with WhatsApp phishingDetermine 1: Assault chain within the WhatsApp STAC3150 marketing campaign

Assault development

The assaults begin with a message that’s despatched utilizing the WhatsApp “View As soon as” choice (see Determine 2).WhatsApp lure in Portuguese, along with English translation

Determine 2: WhatsApp lure (left) and translation (proper)

The lure delivers a ZIP archive that comprises a malicious VBS or HTA file. When executed, this malicious file launches PowerShell to retrieve second-stage payloads, together with a PowerShell or Python script that collects WhatsApp person knowledge and, in later instances, an MSI installer that delivers the Astaroth malware. Determine 3 exhibits the adjustments in downloader scripts and second-stage information over the course of the marketing campaign.

Changes in file formats used in STAC3150 campaign

Determine 3: File codecs used within the STAC3150 marketing campaign between September 24 and October 31, 2025

In late September incidents, Sophos analysts noticed PowerShell getting used to retrieve the second-stage payloads by way of IMAP from an attacker-controlled e mail account. In early October, the marketing campaign shifted to HTTP-based communication, leveraging PowerShell’s Invoke-WebRequest command to contact a distant command and management (C2) server hosted on https: //www . varegjopeaks . com (see Determine 4).

Display of PowerShell commands launched from malicious VBS file

Determine 4: First-stage PowerShell instructions launched from malicious VBS file

The downloaded second-stage PowerShell or Python script (see Determine 5) makes use of the Selenium Chrome WebDriver and the WPPConnect JavaScript library to hijack WhatsApp Net periods, harvest contact data and session tokens, and facilitate spam distribution.

Extracts of PowerShell and Python scripts used to collect WhatsApp data

Determine 5: PowerShell (left) and Python (proper) scripts for WhatsApp knowledge assortment

In late October, the second-stage information started to additionally embody an MSI file (installer.msi) that delivers Astaroth malware.  The installer file writes information to disk and creates a startup registry key to keep up persistence. When executed, it launches the Astaroth malware by way of a malicious AutoIt script that masquerades as a .log file (see Determine 6). The malware communicates with a C2 server hosted at manoelimoveiscaioba . com.

AutoIT payload execution command

Determine 6: AutoIt payload execution

Victimology

Sophos analysts noticed this marketing campaign affecting greater than 250 clients, with roughly 95% of the impacted units positioned in Brazil. The remaining had been positioned in different Latin American international locations, the U.S., and Austria (see Determine 7).

Map showing locations of impacted Sophos customer devices

Determine 7: Distribution of Sophos buyer units impacted by the WhatsApp marketing campaign deploying Astaroth between October 23 and October 28, 2025

Suggestions, detections, and indicators

Organizations ought to educate staff concerning the dangers of opening archive attachments despatched by way of social media and on the spot messaging platforms, even when obtained from recognized contacts.

SophosLabs has developed the countermeasures in Desk 1 to detect exercise related to this risk.

Identify Description
VBS/DwnLdr-ADJT Detection for preliminary VBS file
VBS/DwnLdr-ADJW Detection for preliminary VBS file
VBS/DwnLdr-ADJS Detection for second-stage VBS file
Troj/Mdrop-KEP Detection for second-stage MSI file
Troj/Mdrop-KES Detection for second-stage MSI file
Troj/AutoIt-DJB Detection for AutoIt payload
Troj/HTADrp-CE Detection for HTA script

Desk 1: Sophos detections related to this risk

The risk indicators in Desk 2 can be utilized to detect exercise associated to this risk. The domains could comprise malicious content material, so think about the dangers earlier than opening them in a browser.

Indicator Sort Context
manoelimoveiscaioba[.]com Area identify C2 server utilized in WhatsApp STAC3150 marketing campaign
varegjopeaks[.]com Area identify C2 server utilized in WhatsApp STAC3150 marketing campaign
docsmoonstudioclayworks[.]on-line Area identify C2 server utilized in WhatsApp STAC3150 marketing campaign
shopeeship[.]com Area identify C2 server utilized in WhatsApp STAC3150 marketing campaign
miportuarios[.]com Area identify C2 server utilized in WhatsApp STAC3150 marketing campaign
borizerefeicoes[.]com Area identify C2 server utilized in WhatsApp STAC3150 marketing campaign
clhttradinglimited[.]com Area identify C2 server utilized in WhatsApp STAC3150 marketing campaign
lefthandsuperstructures[.]com Area identify C2 server utilized in WhatsApp STAC3150 marketing campaign

Desk 2: Indicators for this risk

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