For instance, within the state of affairs illustrated within the determine above, the shared sequence of tokens could be “Mechanism Design for”. The distributions could be [(“Large”, 0.8), (“Generative”, 0.2)] for the LLM of Agent 1, (“Giant”, 1.0) for the LLM of Agent 2, and (“Generative”, 1.0) for the LLM of Agent 3. The bids could be 1, 2, and a couple of, respectively. A attainable aggregated distribution can be the bid-weighted common of the distributions, particularly [(“Large”, 0.56), (“Generative”, 0.44)]. A attainable selection for the funds can be to ask every agent to pay their bid, which might have the brokers commit 1, 2, and a couple of, respectively.
For our theoretical evaluation of this mannequin (and choices of distribution aggregation capabilities and cost capabilities), we assume that the brokers honestly report their distributions, however could also be strategic about their bids. We imagine this can be a reasonable assumption, as LLMs encode preferences over output textual content in a succinct and non-obvious means. Furthermore, to ensure that the token public sale to have the ability to combination distributions, we have to have (a minimum of) some (minimal) details about agent’s preferences away from their “most popular” distributions. Our strategy right here is to imagine that the brokers have (recognized) partial desire orders over distributions. That’s, we assume that brokers might be able to rank some, however not all, pairs of distributions.
