Russia’s Adjustments within the Conduct of Warfare Based mostly on Classes from Ukraine Adapting Know-how, Pressure Buildings and the Defence Trade – sUAS Information

Col. Vytis Andreika, Lithuanian Armed Forces

Russia has demonstrated a exceptional potential to shortly study and innovate regardless of struggling substantial losses in Ukraine. This makes Russia a difficult enemy that defies earlier assumptions about its navy strengths. This text argues that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) has efficiently tailored their conduct of conflict by integrating new applied sciences and techniques, thereby enhancing their fight effectiveness towards the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). By specializing in drone and digital warfare (EW), this adaptation has led to demonstrable shifts in battlefield dynamics and has boosted operational capabilities, presenting a critical problem to conventional NATO protection methods.

Utilizing the navy improvements idea developed by Michael C. Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, this text examines how the AFRF has tailored its conduct of conflict primarily based on classes from the continuing conflict in Ukraine, significantly the place the AFRF has demonstrated important technological and tactical developments.¹ Horowitz and Pindyck’s idea outlines the levels of invention, incubation, and implementation, that are utilized to research three particular case research: using Iranian one-way assault (OWA) Shahed drones, first-person-view (FPV) drones, and light-weight EW methods. Of observe, this text doesn’t discover different navy improvements like glide aviation bombs or reconnaissance-strike complexes, as their examination would exceed the scope of this text.

This evaluation exhibits the AFRF’s potential to innovate, difficult perceptions of its rigidity and resistance to vary. Army improvements in using Shahed drones, FPV drones, and counter-unmanned aerial automobiles (C-UAV) whereas additionally utilizing light-weight EW methods illustrate Russia’s capability to institutionalize innovation inside its doctrine, pressure constructions, and the military-industrial advanced. These adjustments are a possible risk to the Baltic States and their NATO allies, given its geographical proximity. It highlights the pressing want to deal with these challenges to organize for future wars.

A Concept of Army Improvements

Analyzing navy innovation idea permits us to evaluate if Russia has tailored its means of conflict by way of classes from the conflict with Ukraine. Of their examine, “What Is a Army Innovation and Why It Issues,” Horowitz and Pindyck argue that there isn’t any consensus on the wide selection of conceptual definitions of navy innovation. They suggest a brand new theoretical framework for understanding navy improvements.²

They outline navy improvements as “adjustments within the conduct of warfare designed to extend a navy’s potential to generate energy” by way of invention, incubation, and implementation.³ The primary stage, invention, is creating new applied sciences or techniques, or modifying current ones to unravel particular issues in new methods. The second stage, incubation, is the merchandise of invention gaining standing and affect by way of advocacy or experimentation by way of bottom-up or top-down processes. The third stage, implementation, is the top-down technique of political leaders main the related neighborhood of curiosity to undertake the invention. Typically, after adoption, the innovation can diffuse and unfold to different international locations.⁴

Be aware that these adjustments should happen on the operational stage or be tactical by nature, however they need to even be operationally important to be adopted and be meant to boost or translate into precise navy energy. Furthermore, navy organizations change their means of conflict after they bear a navy innovation course of (see determine 1) that begins with the invention, features a interval of incubation wherein the invention is seen as important, and ends with the implementation of the invention.⁵

Determine 1. Army Innovation Course of

(Determine from Michael C. Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, “What Is a Army Innovation and Why It Issues,” Journal of Strategic Research [2023])

Russia could bear the method of navy innovation otherwise. Nonetheless, Horowitz and Pindyck’s proposed navy innovation idea permits for the group and comparability of innovation instances to deal with whether or not the AFRF is altering its means of conflict primarily based on classes from the conflict in Ukraine. Utilizing this framework, three navy improvements from the continuing conflict—Iranian OWA Shahed drones, FPV drones, and C-UAV EW methods—are analyzed.

One-Manner Assault Shahed Drone

Making use of Horowitz and Pindyck’s framework to the AFRF’s adoption of Iranian OWA Shahed drones demonstrates every stage of navy innovation. These low-cost drones allow Russia to proceed focusing on crucial infrastructure and terrorizing the civilian inhabitants, thereby overstretching Ukrainian air defenses (AD) and enabling the AFRF to rebuild depleted shares of costlier missiles.

The Shahed drones—Shahed-136 and Shahed-131—are delta-wing drones able to carrying as much as 40 kg of explosive payloads to preplanned targets over lengthy (900 to 1,500 km) distances at speeds as much as 170 km/h (see determine 2).⁶ They’re a pretty different to ballistic and cruise missiles as a result of their low value and ease of manufacturing.

Determine 2. Shahed-136/Geran-2 One-Manner Assault Drone

(Determine by Alexpl by way of Wikimedia Commons)

The impetus for the diffusion of Iranian Shahed expertise into Russian warfare was the depleted shares of conventional missiles and the necessity to conduct sustained assaults on Ukrainian infrastructure. The AFRF started utilizing Shahed drones in early September 2022, with Russian operators receiving coaching in Iran.⁷ The AFRF had most likely used 86 p.c of its Iskander missiles, 46 p.c of its sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles, and 52 p.c of its air-launched cruise missiles by October 2022.⁸ In response to Russian navy consultants, the Shahed drone represents a brand new sort of weapon that’s remodeling the Russian technique of saturating navy and civilian infrastructure deep inside Ukraine at a fraction of the fee.⁹ With an estimated value of $35,000 per unit, Shahed drones supply a cheap different to the Iskander M ballistic missiles (roughly $2 million) and Kalibr cruise missiles ($1 million).¹⁰ To counter this saturation technique, Ukraine was pressured to allocate its assets and adapt its AD techniques.

The mass manufacturing of Shahed drones highlights Russia’s dedication to integrating this expertise. As Iran equipped a number of hundred Shahed drones to the AFRF, there have been initially just a few instances of its utilization.¹¹ After seeing its effectiveness, Russia made a top-down resolution to amass extra Shahed drones. In early 2023, the Russian military-industrial advanced signed a $1.75 billion franchise cope with Iran to provide six thousand Shahed drones to the AFRF by September 2025 and to construct a manufacturing facility in Alabuga, Tatarstan, to fabricate a modified model of the drone beneath the names Geran-1/2.¹² The manufacturing facility began manufacturing in Might 2023 and averaged about twenty drones per workday.¹³ Between January and September 2024, the manufacturing facility produced 5,760 drones, fulfilling the contract settlement.¹⁴ In mid-2023, the Russian navy made one other top-down resolution to mass produce the ten occasions cheaper, low-tech decoy drones Gerbera, which have been meant to make themselves conspicuous to radars and deplete or distract the AFU AD, thereby enhancing the penetration fee of the armed Shahed drones.¹⁵ As drone manufacturing ramped up, the variety of drone assaults considerably elevated in its efforts to oversaturate the AFU AD (see determine 3).¹⁶

Determine 3. Month-to-month Missiles and Drones Launched by Kind (September 2022–December 2024)

(Determine from Neil Hollenbeck et al., “Calculating the Price-Effectiveness of Russia’s Drone Strikes,” Heart for Strategic and Worldwide Research,
19 February 2025, https://www.csis.org/evaluation/calculating-cost-effectiveness-russias-drone-strikes)

Whereas particular unit designations stay unconfirmed, the AFRF has seemingly built-in Shahed drones into specialised models beneath the Russian Aerospace Forces. Devoted Shahed drone models and the fixed enhance in utilization recommend an evolution of tactical thought concerning the drones, even when it’s not formally codified in AFRF doctrine.

Early on, between September and December 2022, Russia used drones in uncoordinated assaults in the course of the day utilizing nap-of-the-earth flight profiles alongside highways or riverbeds. The AFU responded by establishing cellular hearth teams and destroying the drones utilizing machine-gun hearth.¹⁷ Nonetheless, in early 2023, the AFRF refined their techniques to incorporate swarm assaults, launching six to eight Shahed drones at evening. The AFU responded by utilizing all obtainable means to defeat the assaults, together with cellular hearth teams, EW methods, man-portable air protection methods, short-range air defenses, tactical plane and helicopters, and hardening infrastructure.¹⁸ 

By the top of 2023, the AFRF started focusing on crucial infrastructure with large waves of Shahed drones mixed with conventional precision missiles. The AFRF would make use of the Gerbera decoy drones to set off Ukraine’s AD radar illumination, recording their positions after which being adopted by Shahed drones. Hours later, cruise missiles can be launched to both bypass or overwhelm the AD methods, after which be adopted by ballistic missiles timed to coincide with the approaching Shahed drones and extra cruise missiles from varied instructions at a number of targets. This tactic aimed to overload the AFU AD and saturate chosen targets with excessive aerial threats, thereby depleting Ukraine’s restricted AD assets.¹⁹ To counter this tactic, the AFU started utilizing EW groups geared up with the Pokrova EW system to spoof the Shahed drones’ inside international navigation satellite tv for pc system (GNSS) indicators, resulting in important flight path errors.²⁰ 

To cut back the vulnerability to EW spoofing, Russia started putting in a separate navigation system referred to as Kometa, which featured an eight-element GPS-controlled reception sample antenna that enhanced the drone’s resilience towards GNSS sign jamming and spoofing, except the AFU additionally employed EW suppression triangulation.²¹ In late March 2025, open-source proof prompt that the AFRF has since up to date their techniques. Russia now strikes a goal concurrently somewhat than sending drones in waves.²² This evolution demonstrates Russia’s potential to adapt and innovate in response to battlefield realities.

Russian state-media-released video on 20 July 2025 particulars one of many nation’s key drone meeting facilities in Alabuga, Tatarstan. This manufacturing facility domestically manufactures the Iranian-designed Shahed drones beneath the identify Geran-2, supporting Russia’s ongoing conflict towards Ukraine. (Screenshot from Zvezda TV)

In conclusion, deploying Shahed drones demonstrates how the AFRF has realized, evolving its navy methods by way of innovation. Russia subtle Iranian expertise in the course of the invention stage to unravel missile inventory shortages and maintain long-range strike functionality. Throughout incubation, the AFRF experimented with uncoordinated assaults, refined techniques, and institutionalized drone manufacturing by way of partnerships and home manufacturing. Within the implementation stage, Russia mass-produced and upgraded Shahed drones, included them into new drone pressure constructions and built-in them into swarm techniques and deep strikes with precision missiles to overload Ukrainian AD.

FPV Drones

The rising use of FPV drones marks one other important shift in Russia’s means of conflict in Ukraine. Throughout its second 12 months, Russia confronted a major enhance within the deployment of low-cost and deadly Ukrainian FPV drones, which progressively took a number one position (as much as 70 p.c) in inflicting losses to gear and manpower, making frontline breaches just about inconceivable.²³ Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, former AFU commander in chief, emphasised the position of FPV drones within the conflict after recognizing Ukraine’s drawback in weapons and manpower. These drones, a crucial software for precision strikes, minimized direct contact and decreased the variety of casualties.²⁴

Ukraine began mass producing its FPV drones after they confronted a deficit of depleted artillery ammunition shares in August 2023.²⁵ An FPV drone is a low-cost ($500) quadcopter with a video digicam and a 0.7–3 kg improvised armor-piercing, cluster, or thermobaric warhead (see determine 4). Managed remotely by pilots, they will have interaction targets at speeds of 120 km/h over distances from 5 to 10 km.²⁶

Determine 4. Instance of FPV Drones Accessible for Order to Frontline Models from Suppliers

(Determine translated from Normal Workers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Handbook: FPV Drones Utilized by the RF Armed Forces within the SMO [2024])

Recognizing the effectiveness of FPV drones, the AFRF quickly subtle the identical navy innovation inside its forces, showcasing a formidable potential to study and adapt on the battlefield.²⁷ The driving pressure for the unfold of FPV drones was the low-cost precision strikes on Ukrainian fight automobiles and personnel, decreasing the necessity for direct contact and minimizing casualties.

Russian troops construct a two-kilometer mesh web “tunnel” in early 2025 to guard towards Ukrainian FPV drones. In idea, FPV drones on their closing assault trajectory will get entangled within the web or go astray. (Screenshot from X)

Russia exhibits its dedication to navy technological development by utilizing customary, mass-produced FPV drones developed by civilian producers and volunteer organizations. Nonetheless, Russian navy bloggers first identified that these drones carried out inadequately, and the dominance of a single provider restricted the AFRF’s entry to various fashions.²⁸ In response, in April 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD) carried out a top-down resolution to speed up the fielding of FPV drones by funding particular tasks that united civilian volunteers, sponsors, the “Folks’s OPK” (a public initiative to assist the protection trade), and the MOD. Consequently, civilian producers elevated manufacturing volumes of as much as forty thousand drones per 30 days and created new kinds of FPV drones.²⁹ By the top of 2024, the Normal Workers of the AFRF revealed a catalog that includes fifty-eight kinds of FPV drones, which frontline models might order from suppliers.³⁰ This decentralization and independence allowed frontline models to extend their strikes from a number of hundred to nearly two thousand per day.³¹

Because the Russian FPV drones grew to become extra widespread and proved their effectiveness, Russian troops constantly refined drone techniques from the bottom-up, leading to a dramatic enhance in FPV drone strikes. This enhance demonstrates a major shift within the Russian means of conflict, with low-cost precision FPV drones more and more changing or augmenting conventional floor assaults.

First, the FPV drones are designed to destroy any fight car. As an illustration, all tanks are designed to maintain hearth from the entrance. The looks of FPV drones made tanks extraordinarily susceptible, as a result of FPV drones can maneuver and assault from the facet, high, or rear, wherever the armor is weaker.³² This risk grew to become so prevalent on the fashionable battlefield that it pressured AFU armored automobiles to withdraw from frontal positions and stay hidden 3–10 km away from the entrance line; consequently, AFU armored counterattacks grew to become extremely susceptible. This frontline withdrawal allowed the AFRF to extra simply retain seized strongpoints from AFU counterattacks, as AFU assaults have been performed with out fight automobiles in dispersed infantry formations to keep away from being profitable targets (see determine 5).³³

Determine 5. Marked Leopard Tank Indicating Susceptible Elements to an FPV Strike

(Determine tailored from Russian Air Pressure Army Instructional and Scientific Heart, Operation and Use of Unmanned Aerial Autos [FPV drones] [2023])

Second, FPV drones have grow to be individualized weapons, capable of chase a single AFU soldier on the entrance line. Russian navy consultants declare that there are sectors on the entrance line the place the AFRF has FPV drone superiority, the AFU has dominance, and there’s parity. In these areas, each troopers motion is instantly focused by two to 3 drones inside 6 km from the entrance and both facet.³⁴ The mix of FPV drone strikes in live performance with glide aviation bombs and artillery barrages has grow to be so lethal that it pressured the AFU to adapt by dispersing troops and altering its techniques.³⁵

Third, the AFRF started to isolate Ukrainian strongpoints with FPV drones by interdicting their move of troops and provides 3–10 km behind the entrance.³⁶ This new tactic pressured the AFU to withdraw from some positions or conduct sustainment operations by strolling 5 km and carrying as much as 40 kg of provides.³⁷ To counter the identical risk from the Ukrainian facet in early 2025, the AFRF began establishing mesh tunnels to guard their floor provide routes.³⁸ This tactical evolution of FPV utilization demonstrates Russia’s potential to adapt and innovate in response to battlefield realities.

Most of those bottom-up pushed techniques have been institutionalized in Russian navy tactical publications. The Army Coaching and Analysis Centre of the Russian Air Pressure launched a publication within the final quarter of 2023 titled Operation and Use of Unmanned Aerial Autos (FPV Drones), which describes FPV traits, preparation, piloting, upkeep, security directions, and establishing requirements for theoretical, simulator, and flight coaching inside the AFRF.³⁹ Moreover, Russian volunteers launched a memo for troopers describing directions for making ready warheads for FPV drones, together with the dismantling of Javelin missiles.⁴⁰ Lastly, Russian volunteers additionally revealed within the final quarter of 2024 the Handbook on the Ways of Utilizing FPV Drones by the Enemy (in Diagrams) and Strategies of Counteraction, which incorporates nineteen tactical purposes of FPV drones (see determine 6).⁴¹ The event of recent doctrine underscores the institutionalization of this innovation inside the AFRF.

Determine 6. Tactical Software of FPV Drones Instance—Utilizing Fiber-Optic Cable for Management

(Determine translated from Volunteers, Handbook on Ways of Utilizing FPV Drones by the Enemy [in Diagrams] and Strategies of Counteraction [2024])

The implementation of FPV drones led to the formal incorporation of FPV drone crews on the tactical-unit stage. Notably, the Russian MOD introduced in January 2024 that the primary UAV firm was fashioned on the entrance line with FPV crews partaking enemy targets.⁴² The composition of FPV crews was seemingly subtle from the AFU and included 4 individuals: a senior, an FPV drone operator, an ammunition specialist, and a reconnaissance drone operator.⁴³ In October 2024, the Russian protection minister ordered the “Rubikon” Centre for Potential Unmanned Applied sciences to type 5 unmanned detachments for operations in Ukraine.⁴⁴ The Russian MOD established a wholly new department in December 2024, the unmanned methods troops.⁴⁵ The Russian unmanned methods troops fashioned the primary drone regiment on the navy district stage in January 2025 with forty-one FPV drone strike models. Comparable regiments could also be fashioned in different navy districts sooner or later.⁴⁶ The institution of specialised models underline the institutionalization of this innovation inside the AFRF.

You will need to spotlight that FPV drones nonetheless have particular vulnerabilities: quick flight period (seven to 10 minutes) and vary (as much as 10 km), in addition to vulnerability to EW.⁴⁷ To handle the quick flight time and vary, the AFRF typically strike preidentified targets (e.g., bunkers) if they can’t hit high-value targets or land the drone and wait (as much as six hours) till the goal seems to ambush it.⁴⁸ To increase the vary, the AFRF would possibly use a “mom” agro drone with sign retranslation to carry and launch two to 3 FPV drones as much as 60–70 km.⁴⁹ The ultimate and most vital FPV drone vulnerability is its susceptibility to radio frequency and GNSS sign electromagnetic jamming. In 2024, either side jammed 60–80 p.c of all FPVs operated.⁵⁰ In March 2024, Russians have been the primary to introduce FPV drones with fiber-optic cables to counter electromagnetic jamming, a selected Russian innovation, permitting them to penetrate areas of heavy jamming and hit targets as much as 10 km.⁵¹ In response to Russian navy consultants, this innovation performed an important position in Russia’s current success in retaking Kursk.⁵²

In conclusion, the adoption of FPV drones by the AFRF illustrates fast navy innovation. Russia subtle Ukrainian innovation in the course of the invention stage to reduce casualties and allow standoff, low-cost precision FPV drone strikes on AFU fight automobiles and troops. Throughout incubation, the AFRF experimented with techniques, expertise, drone models and centralized its FPV drone manufacturing. Russia institutionalized FPV drone innovation within the implementation stage by enhancing collaborative manufacturing, standardizing techniques, and adjusting pressure constructions. The AFRF’s evolving drone capabilities spotlight a studying course of pushed by battlefield necessity, exhibiting that Russia is actively altering its method to warfare primarily based on classes realized from the conflict in Ukraine.

Furthermore, impressed by the present conflict, Russia’s allies are diffusing FPV drone improvements into their arsenals. As an illustration, China is intensifying efforts to develop and combine FPV and swarm drones into its armed forces.⁵³ Kim Jong Un, after his troops encountered FPV drones in Ukraine, mass-produced FPV drones in North Korea with technical assist from Russia.⁵⁴ Equally, Serbia’s armed forces adopted Komar FPV drones developed by Serbian protection trade enterprises in 2024.⁵⁵

Light-weight C-UAV EW Methods

The in depth use of company-level light-weight C-UAV EW methods represents a 3rd navy innovation within the Ukraine conflict. Whereas not initially a Russian invention, the nation’s mass manufacturing and integration of those methods into its pressure constructions and doctrine have considerably altered its method to trendy warfare. The risk from drones was already evident throughout wars in Donbas and Syria.⁵⁶ Again then, EW methods proved the simplest approach to counter drones by jamming their GNSS positioning, navigation, and timing indicators or radio frequency hyperlinks, which management drones or share video information.⁵⁷ Throughout that point, Russia had invented and developed principally vehicle-based C-UAV EW methods like Krasukha-4 (2014), Pole-21 (2016), Shipovnik-Aero (2016), Repellent-1 (2017), Silok-01 (2018), or Palantin (2019).⁵⁸ One situation the AFRF confronted after invading Ukraine was that these giant and complex vehicle-based C-UAV EW methods grew to become high-value targets for AFU long-range fires.⁵⁹ This case led to a different drawback: there have been too few of those methods to successfully cowl the whole entrance line.

The fast proliferation of small drones caught the AFRF considerably off guard. Ukrainian drones have been serving to to reconnoiter, direct or regulate oblique hearth, command troops, or drop improvised explosives, mines, or grenades on Russian troops.⁶⁰ This situation grew to become very grave for the AFRF as a result of a $200 commercially obtainable off-the-shelf Ukrainian DJI Mavic drone might destroy a $3 million Russian tank by merely dropping a grenade by way of an open hatch and detonating the ammunition saved contained in the turret.⁶¹ The introduction of company-level light-weight C-UAV EW methods considerably improved the AFRF’s potential to guard its forces from drone assaults.

Because of the in depth risk from Ukrainian drones, the AFRF urgently wanted to develop each kinetic and nonkinetic options to guard frontline models, a necessity formally acknowledged by the Russian MOD in its tactical handbook REMINDER on Safety and Counteraction In opposition to Enemy UAVs. The handbook institutionalized using vehicle-based C-UAV EW methods and antidrone rifles. In response to the handbook, EW firms needed to deploy EW methods just like the Lesochek, Pole-01, or Silok-01 to guard high-value targets resembling command posts or artillery positions (see determine 7); in distinction, EW property just like the Zhitel and Palantin needed to defend frontline models. It was advisable that every infantry platoon have one operator with an antidrone rifle for shut safety towards drones.⁶² As seen from the handbook, different company-level light-weight C-UAV EW navy improvements resembling vehicle-mounted C-UAV jammers, drone detectors, and moveable C-UAV jammer domes that the AFU already utilized have been nonetheless within the incubation interval inside the AFRF as of mid-2023.

Determine 7. Illustration of Russian C-UAV Tactic in Mid-2023 Utilizing Pole-21 and Silok-01

(Determine translated from Russian Ministry of Defence, REMINDER on Safety and Counteraction In opposition to Enemy UAVs [2024])

The sudden inflow of lethal Ukrainian FPV drones focusing on Russian fight automobiles seemingly spurred the fast improvement of car jammers by the Russians. These vehicle-mounted C-UAV jammers create a protecting “dome” across the car by jamming a number of frequencies inside a specified radius to disrupt drone communications and navigation.⁶³ By the top of October 2023, the Russian MOD launched a collection of pointers to make sure the safety of fight automobiles from FPV drones, together with using 4 vehicle-mounted C-UAV jammers (see determine 8).⁶⁴ Two extra vehicle-mounted C-UAV jammers have been additionally codified into Russian doctrine on the finish of 2024.⁶⁵ Pressing standardization and mass manufacturing of vehicle-mounted C-UAV jammers signify a major Russian top-down effort to deal with the devastating risk from Ukrainian FPV drones.

Determine 8. Illustration Explaining The best way to Use Car-Mounted C-UAV Jammer Volnorez

(Determine from Russian Ministry of Defence, Tips for Guaranteeing the Safety
of APCs from FPV Drones [2023])

The exponential development in Ukrainian FPV drones has allowed for the focusing on of not solely Russian fight automobiles but additionally particular person troopers. Cases of two or three FPV drones pursuing a single soldier have grow to be widespread, necessitating the dispersion and discount of troops within the trenches.⁶⁶ This deadly battlefield surroundings impeded Russian management from implementing and fielding the remaining navy improvements in C-UAV EW on the firm stage.⁶⁷ The target was to equip every infantry platoon place with a drone detector, a conveyable C-UAV jammer dome, and an antidrone rifle.⁶⁸ The introduction of company-level light-weight C-UAV EW methods has considerably improved the AFRF’s potential to guard its forces from drone assaults. A passive drone detector identifies and locates drones and their floor management stations by analyzing video frequencies, whereas the moveable C-UAV jammer dome autonomously detects approaching drones and creates a radio interference “dome,” jamming one or a number of frequencies inside a 200–500-meter radius to disrupt drone communications and navigation.⁶⁹ The antidrone rifle is a handheld gadget that permits the operator to emit directed power at drones, jamming their communications and navigation as much as 5 km.⁷⁰

There was an pressing battlefield demand for these light-weight C-UAV EW gadgets. Like FPV drones, state corporations beneath Rostec, Russian personal firms, and volunteers stepped in to fill these gaps with novel options. In April 2024, the Russian MOD made a top-down resolution to fund small producers’ mass manufacturing of light-weight C-UAV EW gadgets. By the top of 2024, this resolution allowed frontline models to shortly discipline 5 thousand C-UAV EW gadgets per 30 days and develop new kinds of navy improvements.⁷¹ Ukrainian navy EW consultants recognized roughly sixteen kinds of drone detectors developed by Russian firms.⁷² The Normal Workers of the AFRF revealed a catalog the place frontline models might order twelve kinds of moveable C-UAV jammer domes (see determine 9) and twelve antidrone rifles.⁷³ The mass manufacturing of light-weight C-UAV EW methods, supported by state corporations, personal firms, and volunteers, highlights Russia’s dedication to integrating this expertise into its navy technique.

Determine 9. Instance of 4 Kinds of Russian C-UAV Jammer Domes Accessible for Order from Suppliers to Frontline Models

(Determine translated from Normal Workers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Handbook: FPV Drones Utilized by the RF Armed Forces within the SMO [2024])

The proliferation of light-weight jammers led to the evolution of the C-UAV doctrine. The Russian MOD couldn’t sustain with the tempo of battlefield improvements, so Russian volunteers codified counterdrone methods into the Handbook on Ways of Utilizing FPV Drones by the Enemy (in Diagrams) and Strategies of Counteraction. This handbook emphasizes the significance of early detection of enemy drones, both visually or utilizing drone detectors, and their electromagnetic suppression by way of moveable C-UAV EW jamming domes or antidrone rifles.⁷⁴ Regardless of the rising density of C-UAV EW gear on the entrance line, the influence on decreasing drone threats stays unsure. Each side are engaged in intense EW competitors and are dealing with two important challenges.

The primary problem is the fast adjustments and extension of frequency bands utilized by drones’ onboard radio-electronic gear. As an illustration, when Russian C-UAV EW gadgets started jamming customary industrial radio frequencies and navigation indicators, the AFU responded by switching to much less generally used frequencies with increased energy. The AFU then started testing jammed frequencies by sending a single drone; if the frequency was jammed, they might change it and ship one other, and if the drone efficiently handed by way of, they might then ship the remaining by way of the unjammed frequency.⁷⁵ This adaptation pressured Russian EW spectrum analyzers to detect the brand new frequencies and replace their C-UAV jammers accordingly. In response, the AFU started using frequency hopping to evade suppression.⁷⁶ In sure situations, Russians reprogrammed their drones to the identical frequencies, inflicting the AFU to inadvertently jam their drones when trying to counter Russian drones.⁷⁷ Each side have realized that C-UAV EW gadgets can’t be fastened to any single frequency and should be consistently up to date primarily based on electromagnetic detection outcomes. Open-source proof signifies that the AFRF is field-testing C-UAV gear that makes use of synthetic intelligence (AI) to detect and suppress frequencies utilized by the AFU.⁷⁸

The second problem is utilizing superior electromagnetic safety gadgets and applied sciences by drones to forestall C-UAV jamming. For instance, either side have begun encrypting drone radio frequencies, inflicting drones to disregard indicators that don’t match the encryption key.⁷⁹ Moreover, costlier drones make the most of preprogrammed routes, necessitating exact position-tracking strategies.⁸⁰ Lastly, Ukraine and Russia are each creating drones geared up with onboard AI methods able to figuring out and locking onto targets, which may navigate utilizing AI with inertial gyroscopes, thereby eliminating the necessity for command-and-control indicators from operators and rendering them impervious to jamming.⁸¹

In conclusion, the short adaptation and widespread use of light-weight C-UAV EW gadgets by the AFRF spotlight a major change in the way in which of conflict, pushed by the bottom-up battlefield realities in Ukraine. With the rising risk from Ukrainian drones, particularly the lethal FPV fashions, the AFRF has centered on enhancing electromagnetic safety on the firm stage. Initially reliant on giant, vehicle-based EW methods, the AFRF confronted crucial vulnerabilities as a result of their high-value goal standing and restricted protection throughout an enormous entrance line. In response, Russia bypassed conventional bureaucratic hurdles by dramatically accelerating the navy innovation technique of smaller, extra versatile C-UAV options, together with drone detectors, antidrone rifles, moveable jamming domes, and vehicle-mounted jammers. After the diffusion of those applied sciences from Ukrainian forces, Russians carried out them by way of decentralized mass manufacturing and doctrinal integration.

The extraordinary competitors between Russia and Ukraine in countering drones highlights the necessity for steady innovation to keep up an edge and has broader implications. The teachings realized from this conflict have formed Russia’s method to warfare and influenced different international locations like China to diffuse related counterdrone applied sciences into their navy.⁸²

Conclusions and Additional Analysis

This text has demonstrated that the AFRF has efficiently tailored its conduct of conflict primarily based on classes from the conflict in Ukraine, difficult earlier assumptions about its rigidity. As argued within the introduction, the AFRF has successfully built-in new applied sciences and techniques—notably OWA Shahed drones, FPV drones, and light-weight C-UAV EW methods—to boost fight effectiveness towards the AFU, resulting in demonstrable shifts in battlefield dynamics.

Russia has efficiently subtle and built-in Shahed drones, enabling cost-effective, long-range saturation assaults on Ukrainian crucial infrastructure and inhabitants. By diffusing and implementing FPV drone warfare into its technique, Russia has been capable of perform low-cost precision strikes which have considerably altered battlefield dynamics. Lastly, the diffusion and use of light-weight C-UAV EW methods have enhanced Russia’s potential to defend towards the risk from Ukrainian drones on the firm stage.

A Russian soldier carries an antidrone rifle. For the reason that starting of the conflict in Ukraine, Russian troopers have acquired improved antidrone rifles which might be able to drone detection at a distance of as much as one kilometer. (Picture from the Russian Ministry of Defence)

By way of the lens of navy improvements idea, it’s evident that Russia is adapting its techniques and expertise primarily based on classes from Ukraine, institutionalizing adjustments inside its doctrine, pressure constructions, and the military-industrial advanced. This ongoing course of underscores the dynamic nature of contemporary warfare and the necessity for steady developments to keep up a strategic edge. Recognizing this, the Russian MOD introduced the “Voentekh” venture in February 2025 to speed up the implementation of technological improvements by testing new merchandise on the battlefield and introducing them to the AFRF.⁸³

Total, the AFRF’s potential to innovate and adapt by way of the combination of recent applied sciences and techniques challenges typical knowledge about its navy capabilities and the way Russia will reconstitute its navy pressure following the conflict’s conclusion in Ukraine.⁸⁴ The unfold of those applied sciences to Russian allies highlights their broader influence on international safety. These developments pose potential threats to the Baltic States and their NATO allies, wherein they might want to tackle these challenges to be prepared for future conflict. Additional analysis might establish whether or not the Baltic States and their NATO allies want to vary their legacy navy methods to boost their AD methods to detect and counter the persistent risk of OWA drones like Shahed and spend money on the event of light-weight C-UAV EW options to guard their fight automobiles and troops from the upcoming risk of Russian FPV drones.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Idea emphasizes the necessity to preserve technological superiority and spend money on innovation.⁸⁵ Additional analysis might additionally decide whether or not low-cost and scalable OWA drones, FPV drones, and light-weight C-UAV EW options are mature sufficient improvements to be subtle and carried out into the Baltic States and their NATO allies’ doctrine, pressure constructions, and protection industries.

The article was initially written as a analysis paper for the Baltic Defence School’s Strategic Stage Greater Command Research Course. My due to Army Assessment’s Beth Warrington, whose enter considerably improved this text’s readability and general high quality.

Notes 

1. Michael C. Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, “What Is a Army Innovation and Why It Issues,” Journal of Strategic Research 46, no. 1 (2023): 85–114, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2038572.
2. Horowitz and Pindyck, “What Is a Army Innovation,” 85.
3. Horowitz and Pindyck, “What Is a Army Innovation,” 99.
4. Horowitz and Pindyck, “What Is a Army Innovation,” 100–2.
5. Horowitz and Pindyck, “What Is a Army Innovation,” 102.
6. Uzi Rubin, Russia’s Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile (Royal United Companies Institute [RUSI], 13 January 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile.
7. Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), Tips to Mixed Arms Models to Fight Iranian-Made Strike UAVs “Shahed-136” (“Geran-2”) and the Russian Federation “Lancet-2” (In response to the Expertise of the Russian-Ukrainian Warfare of 2022–2023) (Heart for Operational Requirements and Strategies of Coaching of the AFU and Fundamental Directorate of Doctrines and Coaching of the Normal Workers of the AFU, March 2023), 7.
8. Michael Starr, “‘Demilitarization of Russia’: Ukraine Says Russia Operating Out of Missiles,” Jerusalem Publish, 16 October 2022, https://www.jpost.com/worldwide/article-719795.
9. Alexy Velikiy and Nikita Shorkin, “Анализ развития БЛА типа «барражирующий боеприпас». Часть 1” [Analysis of the development of the “loitering munition” type UAV. Part 1], Арсенал Отечества [Arsenal of the fatherland], 15 January 2025, https://arsenal-otechestva.ru/article/1910-analiz-razvitiya-bla-tipa-barrazhiruyushchij-boepripas-chast-1#.
10. Neil Hollenbeck et al., “Calculating the Price-Effectiveness of Russia’s Drone Strikes,” Heart for Strategic and Worldwide Research, 19 February 2025, https://www.csis.org/evaluation/calculating-cost-effectiveness-russias-drone-strikes.
11. Michelle Grisé et al., Russia’s Army After Ukraine: Potential Pathways for the Russian Armed Forces (RAND, 16 January 2025), 170, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2713-1.html.
12. David Albright et al., Alabuga’s Drastically Expanded Manufacturing Price of Shahed 136 Drones (Institute for Science and Worldwide Safety, 10 Might 2024), https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/element/alabugas-greatly-expanded-production-rate-of-shahed-136-drones/.
13. Albright et al., Alabuga’s Drastically Expanded Manufacturing Price of Shahed 136 Drones.
14. Clare Sebastian et al., “Russia Is Intensifying Its Air Warfare in Ukraine. A Secretive Manufacturing facility Is Ramping up Drone Manufacturing to Gas the Offensive,” CNN, up to date 27 December 2024, https://version.cnn.com/2024/12/27/europe/russia-ukraine-war-drones-alabuga-factory-intl-invs/index.html.
15. “Цветочки для ВСУ: как работают дроны «Герань-2» и «Гербера»” [Flowers for the AFU: How the “Geranium-2” and “Gerbera” drones work], Izvestia, 25 October 2024, https://iz.ru/1779810/2024-10-25/tcvetochki-dlia-vsu-kak-rabotaiut-drony-geran-2-i-gerbera.
16. Hollenbeck et al., “Calculating the Price-Effectiveness of Russia’s Drone Strikes.”
17. AFU, Tips to Mixed Arms Models, 14–15.
18. AFU, Tips to Mixed Arms Models, 46–50.
19. Tom Cooper, “Ukraine Warfare, 29 December 2023: Begin of the Winter Missile Marketing campaign,” Sarcastosaurus Substack, 29 December 2023, https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-29-december-2023-start.
20. “Pokrova EW System Is a Actual Recreation-Changer within the Ukrainian Battle In opposition to Shahed-136 Drones and Cruise Missiles, That Renders GPS Receivers Ineffective,” Protection Categorical, 4 November 2023, https://en.defence-ua.com/occasions/pokrova_ew_system_is_a_real_game_changer_in_ukrainian_fight_against_shahed_136_drones_and_cruise_missiles_that_renders_gps_receivers_useless-8462.html.
21. Estonian International Intelligence Service (EFIS), Worldwide Safety and Estonia 2025 (EFIS, 20 December 2024), 14, https://raport.valisluureamet.ee/2025/add/vla_eng-raport_2025_WEB.pdf.
22. Stefan Korshak, “March 29—Day 1129—Belgorod in Focus, Defensive Drills with Drones, Balanced Assaults,” Medium, 29 March 2025, https://medium.com/@Stefan.Korshak/march-29-day-1129-belgorod-in-focus-defensive-drills-with-drones-balanced-attacks-82fe7ecf6f8a.
23. Добровольцы [Volunteers], Справочник. Тактика применения противником FPV-дронов (в схемах) и способы противодействия [Handbook on tactics of using FPV drones by the enemy (in diagrams) and methods of counteraction] (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2024), 3.
24. Alisa Orlova, “Rethinking Warfare—Key Takeaways from Zaluzhny’s CNN Column,” Kyiv Publish, 2 February 2024, https://www.kyivpost.com/publish/27504.
25. Francis Farrell, “Lethal Drone Arms Race Intensifies as Ukraine, Russia Embrace the Way forward for Warfare,” Kyiv Impartial, 13 September 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/head-first-into-the-future-inside-the-race-to-win-the-drone-war-in-ukraine/.
26. Mariano Zafra et al., “How Drone Fight in Ukraine Is Altering Warfare,” Reuters, 26 March 2024, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/.
27. “FPV-революция: как дроны-камикадзе изменили ситуацию на фронте” [FPV revolution: How kamikaze drones have changed the situation on the frontline], posted 6 June 2024 by Редакция [Editorial staff], YouTube, 51 min., 51 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSP258qGYjU.
28. Institute for the Examine of Warfare (ISW) Press, Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, April 23, 2024 (ISW, 23 April 2024), https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2024.
29. Ilya Plamenev, “Белоусов объяснил необходимость создания нового рода войск” [Belousov explained the need to create a new branch of the military], RBC, 21 December 2024, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/21/12/2024/6766de049a79475899cc6ebb.
30. ГШ, ВС РФ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation], Справочник. FPV-дроны применяемые BC РФ в CBO [Handbook. FPV drones used by the RF Armed Forces in the SMO] (Normal Workers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, 2024), 5–35.
31. Donald Hill, “Don’s Weekly, 6 January 2025: Half 3,” Sarcastosaurus Substack, 6 January 2025, https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/dons-weekly-6-january-2025-part-3.
32. Редакция, “FPV-революция.”
33. Редакция, “FPV-революция.”
34. Редакция, “FPV-революция.”
35. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Tactical Developments Throughout the Third Yr of the Russo-Ukrainian Warfare (RUSI, 14 February 2025), 9, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/tactical-developments-during-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war.
36. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 7.
37. Donald Hill, “Don’s Weekly, 19 February 2024: Half 1,” Sarcastosaurus Substack, 19 February 2024, https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/dons-weekly-19-february-2024-part.
38. Donald Hill, “Don’s Weekly, 10 February 2025: Half 2,” Sarcastosaurus Substack, 10 February 2025, https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/dons-weekly-10-february-2025-part-82d.
39. ВУНЦ, ВВС [Russian Air Force Military Educational and Scientific Center], Эксплуатация и применение беспилотных летательных аппаратов (FPV-дронов) [Operation and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (FPV drones)] (Russian Air Pressure Army Instructional and Scientific Heart, 2023).
40. Добровольцы [Volunteers], Применение ракет, гранат и инженерных боеприпасов в качестве боевой части для различных типов БПЛА [The use of rockets, grenades and engineering munitions as warheads for various types of UAVs] (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2023).
41. Добровольцы, Справочник, 6–24.
42. “В составе группировки войск «Запад» сформировали роту БПЛА” [A UAV company was formed as part of the “West” military group], TASS, 26 January 2024, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/19832741.
43. Добровольцы, Справочник, 5.
44. Миноборона России [Russian Ministry of Defence] (@mod_russia), “Андрей Белоусов проинспектировал работу нового Центра перспективных беспилотных технологий Минобороны” [Andrey Belousov inspected the work of the new Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies of the Ministry of Defence], Telegram, 11 October 2024, https://t.me/mod_russia/44389.
45. “Белоусов: в ВС РФ сформируют «войска беспилотных систем»” [Belousov: The Russian Armed Forces will form “unmanned systems troops”], TASS, 16 December 2024, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/22682103.
46. ISW Press, Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, January 28, 2025 (ISW, 28 January 2025), https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025.
47. Добровольцы, Справочник, 4.
48. Добровольцы, Справочник, 7, 10.
49. Добровольцы, Справочник, 20.
50. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 10.
51. Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Russia Now Seems to Be Utilizing Wire-Guided Kamikaze Drones in Ukraine,” TWZ, 8 March 2024, https://www.twz.com/air/russia-now-looks-to-be-using-wire-guided-kamikaze-drones-in-ukraine.
52. David Hambling, “New Drone Ways Sealed Russian Victory in Kursk,” Forbes, up to date 20 March 2025, https://www.forbes.com/websites/davidhambling/2025/03/17/new-drone-tactics-sealed-russian-victory-in-kursk/.
53. Sunny Cheung and Joe McReynolds, “Autonomous Battlefield: PLA Classes from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” China Temporary 25, no. 6 (28 March 2025), https://jamestown.org/program/autonomous-battlefield-pla-lessons-from-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/.
54. Yevheniia Martyniuk, “NHK: North Korea Constructed a Drone with Russian Assist, Mass Manufacturing Begins This Yr,” Euromaidan Press, 8 February 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/02/08/nhk-north-korea-built-a-drone-with-russian-help-mass-production-starts-this-year/.
55. Dmytro Shumlianskyi, “Serbian Military Begins Utilizing Serbian-Made FPV Drones,” Militarnyi, 29 December 2024, https://mil.in.ua/en/information/serbian-army-begins-using-serbian-made-fpv-drones/.
56. Редакция, “FPV-революция.”
57. Thomas Withington, “Clear Channels,” Armada Worldwide, 13 March 2024, https://www.armadainternational.com/2024/03/secure-drone-communications-milcom/.
58. AFU, Довідник військового зв’язківця. Засоби радіоелектронної боротьби та розвідки, які використовуються Pосійською федерацією [Military communicator’s handbook. Radio electronic warfare and intelligence equipment used by the Russian Federation] (Command of the Sign and Cybersecurity Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Army Institute of Telecommunication and Data Applied sciences Named After the Heroes of Kruty, 2024).
59. Редакция, “FPV-революция.”
60. Миноборона России [Russian Ministry of Defence], ПАМЯТКА по защите и противодействию БпЛА противника [REMINDER on protection and counteraction against enemy UAVs] (Fundamental Directorate of Fight Coaching, 2023), 3.
61. Matthew Loh, “Video Exhibits Ukraine’s ‘Hornet’ Drones Following Russia’s Tanks and Plopping Grenades on High of Them,” Enterprise Insider, 26 September 2023, https://www.businessinsider.com/video-shows-ukraine-drones-following-russian-tanks-dropping-grenades-2023-9.
62. Миноборона России, ПАМЯТКА, 12, 15–20.
63. “New Saniya EW System Seeks to Shield Russian Tanks from FPV Drones, however The place’s Overhyped Volnorez?,” Protection Categorical, 14 January 2024, https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/new_saniya_ew_system_seeks_to_protect_russian_tanks_from_fpv_drones_but_wheres_overhyped_volnorez-9181.html.
64. Миноборона России [Russian Ministry of Defence], Методические рекомендации по обеспечению защиты БТР от FPV дронов [Guidelines for ensuring the protection of APCs from FPV drones] (Fundamental Armored Directorate of the Ministry of Protection of the Russian Federation, 2023), 10–14.
65. ГШ, ВС РФ, Справочник, 59.
66. Добровольцы, Справочник, 27.
67. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 33.
68. Добровольцы, Справочник, 28.
69. Редакция, “FPV-революция”; Bohdan Tuzov, “ANALYSIS: Russia’s Digital Warfare Gear,” Kyiv Publish, 11 Might 2024, https://www.kyivpost.com/evaluation/32435.
70. “Russian Troops Efficiently Use Harpoon-3 Anti-Drone Methods in Ukraine,” Military Recognition, 18 October 2022, https://www.armyrecognition.com/information/army-news/2022/russian-troops-successfully-use-harpoon-3-anti-drone-systems-in-ukraine.
71. Plamenev, “Белоусов объяснил необходимость создания нового рода войск.”
72. AFU, Довідник малі РЕБ ворога [Handbook of small enemy EW devices] (Command of the Sign and Cybersecurity Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Army Institute of Telecommunication and Data Applied sciences Named After the Heroes of Kruty, 2023), 12–16.
73. ГШ, ВС РФ, Справочник, 52–58.
74. Добровольцы, Справочник, 25.
75. Редакция, “FPV-революция.”
76. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 20.
77. Thomas Withington, “Examine the Handbook,” Armada Worldwide, 14 March 2024, https://www.armadainternational.com/2024/03/russian-fpv-drone-manual-milcom/.
78. Isabel van Brugen, “Russia Deploying New AI-Powered Anti-Drone Units,” Newsweek, 30 April 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-artificial-intelligence-ai-drones-ukraine-1895424.
79. Withington, “Clear Channels.”
80. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 19–20.
81. Zafra et al., “How Drone Fight in Ukraine Is Altering Warfare.”
82. Cheung and McReynolds, “Autonomous Battlefield.”
83. “В Минобороны создали новую систему внедрения инно ваций «Воентех»” [The Ministry of Defense has created a new innovation implementation system “Voentekh”], TASS, 18 February 2025, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/23173057.
84. Grisé et al., Russia’s Army After Ukraine, 128.
85. NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Idea (NATO, 2022), 8, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/property/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.

Col. Vytis Andreika is an infantry officer within the Lithuanian Armed Forces. He holds a grasp’s diploma from the Army Academy of Lithuania. His earlier assignments embody serving as navy advisor to the Minister of Defence of Lithuania, commanding the Lithuanian Grand Duke Kęstutis Motorized Infantry Battalion, and finishing two deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan together with varied different command positions. He’s at present serving because the chief of employees of the Lithuanian Armed Forces’ Coaching and Doctrine Command.

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