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Most steadily encountered malware and abused software program – Sophos Information


This appendix to our Annual Risk Report offers further statistics on incident knowledge and telemetry detailing the instruments utilized by cybercriminals focusing on small and midsized companies (SMBs). For a broader take a look at the risk panorama going through SMBs, see our predominant report.

Appendix Contents:

Most often-encountered malware sorts

Small and midsized companies face an enormous set of threats to knowledge—a few of which can be precursors to ransomware assaults or could lead to different breaches of delicate data. Ransomware dominates the malware noticed in Sophos MDR and Sophos Incident Response circumstances from 2024, with the highest 10 accounting for over 25% of all incidents MDR and IR tracked over the 12 months. However they weren’t the whole story, and almost 60% of MDR incidents concerned threats not involving ransomware.

 

 Other12.79% Miner 0.89% Ransomware 1.18% Web/Browser Hijack 3.60% Attack tool/Exploit/EDR Killer 7.95% RAT/Backdoor 15.52% Stealer/Spyware 18.63% Loader/Downloader/Dropper 39.74% 9.13% of all malware was malware-as-a-service

Determine 13: Probably the most generally seen classes of malware detection seen in 2024, based mostly on buyer detection reviews

Qilin (ransomware)1.05% Blacksuit (ransomware) 1.23% Faust (ransomware) 1.23% Crytox (ransomware) 1.41% Playcrypt (ransomware) 1.58% Black Basta (ransomware) 1.93% RansomHub (ransomware) 2.28% Gootloader (malware loader/dropper) 2.64% ChromeLoader (malware loader/dropper) 3.51% Fog (ransomware) 3.51% LockBit (ransomware) 4.39% Lumma Stealer (information stealer) 4.57% Akira (ransomware) 4.92% Cobalt Strike (C2 tool) 8.08% Web shell (C2) 9.84%
Determine 14: High 15 malware and assault instruments encountered in MDR and IR incidents

Command-and-control instruments, malware loaders, distant administration instruments, and information-stealing malware make up the vast majority of the malicious software program seen focusing on small companies (other than ransomware). And these instruments, not all of that are technically malware, are used as a part of the supply of ransomware and different cybercriminal assaults.

Solely one of many high 10 instruments and malware seen in Sophos MDR and IR incidents doesn’t fall into this class: XMRig. It’s a cryptocurrency-mining malware usually used to passively generate income earlier than entry is offered or in any other case exploited by a ransomware actor.

Determine 20: High information-stealing malware detections reported by endpoint safety clients
ExMatter (data exfiltration)0.56% Backstab (EDR killer) 0.56% Parcel RAT 0.56% DataGrabber (data exfiltration) 0.56% AsyncRAT 0.56% Sliver attack tool 0.56% Pikabot backdoor 0.56% Brute Ratel C4 0.56% Metasploit exploit framework 1.11% Grixba network scanning tool 1.11% SystemBC proxy/RAT 1.67% XMRIG miner malware 2.22% Web shell 7.22% Cobalt Strike attack tool 10.56%
Determine 16: High non-ransomware malware and instruments seen in Sophos MDR and Sophos Incident Response circumstances particularly in ransomware-related incidents

 

Twin-use instruments

One development that continues from earlier years is the intensive use of typically accessible industrial, freeware, and open-source software program by cybercriminals to conduct ransomware assaults and different malicious exercise. Sophos MDR refers to those as “dual-use instruments,” as they may very well be current on networks for authentic causes, however are steadily utilized by cybercriminals for malicious functions.

Twin-use instruments are totally different from “living-off-the-land binaries” (LOLBins) in that they’re full purposes deployed and used as meant by malicious actors, fairly than working system-supplied parts and scripting engines. A number of the instruments that fall into “twin use” are particularly safety testing-oriented and meant for pink groups—Impacket and Mimikatz are open-source instruments that have been constructed particularly for safety researchers. Others resembling SoftPerfect Community Scanner and Superior IP Scanner are meant as instruments for community directors, however can be utilized by cybercriminals for discovery of networked units and open community ports.

Advanced Port Scanner (network discovery)4.92% FileZilla (file exfiltration) 5.10% Rclone (file exfiltration) 7.38% 7-Zip (file archiving/encryption) 7.38% PuTTy (remote command execution) 7.73% ScreenConnect (remote desktop access) 9.14% WinRAR (file archiving/encryption) 9.31% Sophos Uninstall (security tool removal) 9.49% Advanced IP Scanner (network discovery) 10.72% Mimikatz (credential dumping) 11.60% RDPclip (remote/local shared clipboard) 16.70% Impacket (network protocol exploitation) 17.05% AnyDesk (remote desktop access) 17.40% PsExec (remote command execution) 18.28% SoftPerfect Network Scanner (network discovery) 19.51%

Determine 17: High 15 “twin use” instruments seen in Sophos MDR and Sophos Incident Response incidents, by frequency

Determine 18: High 9 “twin use” assault instruments in Sophos endpoint detections 

Industrial distant entry instruments are collectively probably the most steadily used dual-use instruments encountered in MDR and IR incidents:

TypeFrequency LevelRMM (remote machine management) 0.70% RemCom (remote command execution) 0.70% MobaXterm (remote shell) 0.88% VNC (remote desktop) 1.58% NetSupport (remote machine management) 1.76% Cloudflared (Cloudflare network tunneling client) 1.76% Ngrok (web application tunneling) 2.11% WinRM (remote machine management) 2.28% Splashtop (remote desktop) 2.99% TeamViewer (remote desktop) 3.16% Atera (remote machine management) 3.51% OpenSSH (remote shell) 4.04% PuTTy (remote shell) 7.73% ScreenConnect (remote desktop) 9.14% AnyDesk (remote desktop) 17.40% PSExec (remote command execution) 18.28%
Determine 19: High 15 dual-use instruments seen in Sophos MDR and Incident Response incidents, by frequency

With industrial distant entry instruments, the attackers normally abuse trial account licenses or use pirated licenses for the variations they deploy to focused machines. In lots of circumstances, that is completed after preliminary exploitation via malware droppers, internet shells, or different command-and-control instruments. In others, it’s pushed via social engineering—getting a focused particular person to obtain and set up the device themselves, as we have now seen in current Groups “vishing” assaults.

Use of authentic distant machine administration instruments, significantly by ransomware actors, has been rising, although distant desktop entry instruments AnyDesk and ScreenConnect stay probably the most steadily used industrial IT help instruments seen in Sophos MDR and IR incidents. And the most typical device stays PSExec, a Microsoft “light-weight Telnet replacement” used to remotely execute instructions and create command shell classes.

Sophos clients can limit their utilization via Sophos Central utilizing utility management insurance policies—and may limit any instruments that aren’t getting used for authentic IT help.

Assault instruments

Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Metasploit, and Brute Ratel are penetration testing instruments, and never malware within the authorized sense. However they’re steadily used to ship malware and for command and management of malware assaults. Having a well-documented, commercially supported post-exploitation device like these is a serious plus for cybercriminals who would in any other case should construct their very own instruments to develop their footprint inside a focused group.

Cobalt Strike stays probably the most closely used of those assault instruments, current in eight % of all incidents and almost 11 % of ransomware-related incidents. It is a vital decline from 2023, when Cobalt Strike was the third most steadily seen industrial device utilized in MDR incidents, rating solely behind the AnyDesk and PSExec distant entry instruments. Sliver and Metasploit-based instruments, which can be found as open-source, are seen even much less steadily, and Brute Ratel utilization by cybercriminals stays extraordinarily uncommon.

Info stealers

Determine 20: High information-stealing malware detections reported by endpoint safety clients

 

Info-stealing malware is usually step one within the entry dealer’s playbook, offering passwords, cookies, and different knowledge that can be utilized for monetary fraud, enterprise e-mail compromise, and ransomware assaults, amongst different schemes.

Lumma Stealer, offered via Russian-speaking boards as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS), was probably the most steadily encountered data stealer in MDR incidents, and second in general endpoint detection reviews. A significant Lumma Stealer marketing campaign starting in October made it probably the most reported stealer for the final quarter of 2024, far surpassing final 12 months’s MaaS stealer chief RaccoonStealer (which launched  a brand new model in 2024 after its infrastructure was disrupted) and by 12 months’s finish eclipsing Strela Stealer (which was rising within the ranks in 2023; it peaked early in 2024, however trailed off within the second half of the 12 months). No MDR incidents tracked in 2024 concerned Strela Stealer.

A chart showing a histogram of Lumma Stealer detections, with a majority of detections occurring in October and November of 2024.

Determine 21: Lumma Stealer exercise in 2024 as noticed in buyer endpoint detections

A histogram showing a peak of Lumma Stealer events in November
Determine 22: Lumma Stealer associated MDR incidents in 2024

 

A histogram showing spikes of Strela Stealer detections in February, March and July of 2024.
Determine 23: Strela Stealer exercise in 2024 as noticed in buyer endpoint detections

First tracked in August 2022, Lumma Stealer is believed to be a successor of  Mars Stealer, one other data stealer purportedly of Russian origin. This stealer primarily targets cryptocurrency wallets, browser session cookies, browser two-factor authentication extensions, saved File Switch Protocol server addresses and credentials, and different consumer and system knowledge.

Like another data stealers (resembling Raccoon Stealer), Lumma Stealer can be used to ship further malware—both by launching executables or PowerShell scripts, or by loading malicious DLLs from its personal course of. Sometimes, Lumma Stealer is delivered from a  compromised web site (usually a faux CAPTCHA internet web page) as a obtain that victims are delivered to through malvertising.

Lumma Stealer is usually related to broader cybercriminal exercise. One other MaaS stealer offered on Russian-language boards, StealC, was seen with a a lot greater correlation to ransomware incidents. Launched in January 2023, it has been labeled by researchers as a RaccoonStealer and Vidar copycat.

Of regional observe is Mispadu Stealer, which continues to focus on Latin America (and Mexico particularly). Within the second quarter of 2024, it was the second-most detected stealer, coming in simply behind Strela Stealer, with 74% of these detections coming from Mexico.  It has been seen utilizing malicious internet and search promoting, notably posing as internet advertisements for McDonald’s.

High ransomware threats

Stealc (information stealer)0.35% AsyncRAT (RAT with infostealer features) 0.53% More_eggs (RAT that can carry infostealer payload) 0.53% Brute Ratel C4 (red team C2 tool) 0.53% Metasploit (red team command and control tool) 0.70% Remcos (RAT) 0.70% FakeBat /EugenLoader (malware loader) 0.70% Sliver (red team C2 tool) 0.88% XMRIG (cryptocurrency miner) 1.05% SystemBC (proxy and RAT) 1.05% Gootloader (malware loader) 2.64% ChromeLoader (browser malware loader) 3.51% Lumma Stealer (information stealer) 4.57% Cobalt Strike (red team C2 tool with information stealing modules) 8.08% Web shell (malware deployment, command and control) 9.84%
Determine 24: Most steadily detected ransomware households throughout all Sophos endpoint clients

 

Cicada33011.64% Mimic 1.64% Hunters International 2.19% INC Ransomware 2.19% 8Base 2.73% Qilin 3.28% Blacksuit 3.83% Faust 3.83% Crytox 4.37% Playcrypt 4.92% Black Basta 6.01% RansomHub 7.10% Fog 10.93% LockBit 13.66% Akira 15.30%
Determine 25: The highest ransomware households encountered in MDR and Incident Response incidents

LockBit, form of

Probably the most-detected ransomware household in 2024 was LockBit, however not due to the ransomware group that spawned it. In February 2024, US and UK legislation enforcement claimed to have disrupted the LockBit group by seizing the ransomware-as-a-service group’s servers, arresting two of its members, and charging one other in an indictment. Within the wake of this disruption, quite a few variants based mostly on the leaked LockBit 3.0 code grew to become energetic within the wild, leading to a spike of LockBit detections in early 2024. Nevertheless, by March, detections trailed off considerably with a slight rebound in April and early Could (although the LockBit gang is probably not gone eternally).

The teams utilizing LockBit 3.0 steadily used EDR killers and different malware and strategies to aim to disable endpoint safety. Their preliminary entry was usually via VPN accounts that had been compromised (in some circumstances because of vulnerabilities within the VPN units themselves), or via the abuse of credentials harvested from unmanaged units to achieve distant entry.

A histogram of Lockbit variant ransomware detections with a spike in late February 2024.
Determine 26: LockBit variant detections per day, 2024

Akira and Fog

When it comes to precise incidents, the Akira ransomware-as-a-service led the pack in 2024, in the end stepping in to fill the void left by LockBit. Initially seen in 2022, Akira assaults ramped up in late 2023. The group and its associates have been steadily energetic all through 2024, spiking in August when Akira accounted for 17% of the ransomware detections reported by Sophos clients—doubling from its place within the first two quarters of the 12 months. By 12 months’s finish, it nonetheless accounted for 9% of ransomware detection reviews.

Notably, Sophos noticed associates tied to Akira additionally deploying different ransomware variants, together with Fog, Frag and Megazord. These attackers (resembling these in STAC5881) usually targeted on exploiting VPNs for preliminary entry. Sometimes, Akira’s targets had VPNs with no multifactor authentication, or had misconfigured VPN gateways that allowed the attackers to achieve entry with stolen credentials or brute power assaults.

Whereas Akira stays energetic, Fog ransomware has sometimes been used as a substitute by associates beforehand related to Akira, which accounts for its place in third among the many high 15 ransomware households encountered in MDR and IR incidents.

RansomHub

RansomHub was one other rising chief in ransomware incidents in 2024. Whereas tied for sixth in general detections, RansomHub was the fourth most noticed ransomware household in precise MDR and IR incidents.

Between February and August 2024, based on a Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Safety Company #StopRansomware advisory, RansomHub had “encrypted and exfiltrated knowledge from no less than 210 victims.” Nearly all of Sophos MDR and IR circumstances involving RansomHub got here within the second half of the 12 months, mounting in numbers in November.

Most RansomHub assaults concerned abuse of RDP along with different authentic distant desktop instruments, together with AnyDesk. Preliminary entry in some reported circumstances got here from leveraging the seven-year-old Home windows SMB Distant Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2017-1444), although this was not noticed within the Sophos MDR and IR circumstances represented in our knowledge. Preliminary entry vectors Sophos X-Ops noticed in RansomHub circumstances included abuse of externally going through Microsoft SQL Servers for command execution, abuse of open RDP and Distant Desktop Internet entry, and compromise of unmanaged units.

 

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